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Savings bank depositors in a crisis:
Glasgow  and 
DUNCAN ROSS
University of Glasgow
Savings banks were created as a means to encourage the newly created working class to save for the
uncertainties of urban industrial life. This article explores the success of the Savings Bank of Glasgow,
and pays particular attention to the response of savers to the financial and commercial crises of 
and . The crisis of  was shallower but longer lasting in Glasgow, while that of  was
greatly exacerbated by local conditions in the short term, but of little long-term importance to savers.
It suggests that, in both crises, some elements of contagion may have been present but that those who
panicked in  were systematically different from those who did not.
Keywords: savings banks, Scotland, banking crises, working-class savings
JEL classification: G, G, N, N
Banking panics were a regular and recurrent feature of the nineteenth-century econ-
omic landscape in Britain. Michael Collins has noted that those of /, ,
, , ,  and  were each characterised – to a greater or lesser
extent – by rapid withdrawals of deposits that contributed to the economic down-
swings with which they were associated (Collins , ). Even as bank failures
themselves became less common through the century, those crises had severe liquidity
impacts on the economy, and were capable of generating a significant response from
depositors, in the form of substantial short-term dissaving. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, it has been suggested that bankers learned a series of harsh
lessons that progressively led them towards a balance sheet dominated by liquid
assets, rather than risky loans to industry (Collins ; Baker and Collins ;
Kennedy ; Best and Humphries ). Amalgamation and centralisation –
designed partly to reassure depositors that their money was safe and secure in the
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larger and geographically diversified banking institutions – should also be seen as one
of the outcomes of this process (Capie and Rodrik-Bali ; Collins and Baker
).
Commercial banks, however, paid little attention to the emergent working classes,
who looked elsewhere for their developing financial needs. Savings banks emerged to
encourage thrift and investment in the future by the newly created urban industrial
working classes, and they spread quickly across the UK after . In the prevailing
environment of recurrent crises, this encouragement required a very clear and unequi-
vocal promise of security and safety for the hard-earned money placed in these new
institutions. By  in England, and  in Scotland, the fundamental principle had
been established by legislation: the banks took in deposits and placed their funds with
the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt. They did not – unlike
their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere – offer loans or engage in financial inter-
mediation. This meant that the banks were unable to participate in the many oppor-
tunities being exploited by the new joint-stock and country banks being created in a
period of early and rapid industrialisation but that – in the absence of default or theft
on the part of bank officers – absolute, cast-iron security was provided to depositors.
To make the deal even more attractive, the return offered was in excess of that avail-
able from commercial banks, particularly as interest rates fell in the years after the
Napoleonic Wars (Moss and Slaven , pp. -; Horne , pp. -).
Savings banks were not entirely immune from the impact of banking panics,
however. Cormac Ó Gráda has shown how country-wide contagion spread among
the savings banks in Ireland during the famine, as well as how the failure of a local
joint-stock institution could result in significant pressure on a savings bank (Ó
Gráda ). Ó Gráda and White’s analysis of the Emigrant Industrial Savings
Bank in New York suggests that the financial panics of  and  can be under-
stood in terms of the two typologies of random withdrawal risk of bank panic set out
by Diamond and Dybvig (Ó Gráda and White ; Kelly and Ó Gráda ;
Diamond and Dybvig ). First, panic occurs when random events cause individual
depositors to withdraw their funds. Other depositors, for fear of being last to safeguard
their money, will follow suit and a run will quickly develop. Alternatively, a run may
begin when some depositors discover adverse information about a bank or its assets,
and withdraw their funds. Other depositors, unable to gauge the strength either of the
individual bank or any other, will likewise move quickly to gain access to their cash.
This article investigates the impact of the financial crises of  and  on the
Savings Bank of Glasgow, one of the largest and most successful of these institutions.
Glasgow, as one of the leading commercial and industrial cities of the day, was severely
affected by these crises. In both years, the savings bank experienced considerable
demands for withdrawal, but it is difficult to categorise these as bank runs of either
sort. In  the problems were greatly exacerbated by the suspension of payments
and collapse of local joint-stock banks. The impact of  was less severe in the
short run but longer lasting. The key question in much of Ó Gráda’s work has
been whether those who panicked and closed their accounts were substantially
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different from those who did not, i.e. whether they had access to specific or private
information. Analysis of the depositors in Glasgow suggests that the crisis of 
was characterised by the general stress on working-class incomes: those who panicked
and closed their accounts at the savings bank were not substantially different from
those who did not. In , however, some significant and systematic differences
are identified, suggesting that, in this case, there was some contagion from the diffi-
culties in the commercial banking sector, and that this was felt most particularly
among the smaller and least wealthy depositors. This latter panic may therefore
have more in common with the kind of contagion outlined by Calomiris, in
which ‘banks that are intrinsically solvent are subjected to large unwarranted withdra-
wals’ (Calomiris , p. ; Calomiris and Gorton ). The article proceeds in the
following way: Section I examines the emergence and growth of savings banks gen-
erally, and in particular notes their focus as providers of financial facilities to the
working class. Section II considers the rise of the Savings Bank of Glasgow and
Section III examines the impact of the commercial and financial crises of  and
. Section IV offers insight into the behaviour of individual depositors in those
crises, and Section V concludes.
I
At the end of the nineteenth century, a variety of institutions emerged whose primary
role was to ease the transition from a society dominated by mutuality and community
to one dominated by capitalist individualism. The New Political Economy of
Malthus, Colquhoun, Townsend, Smith and Ricardo argued that this was as much
a moral as an economic issue: individual choices about how to deal with the vagaries
and uncertainties of urban industrial life revealed much about the character of people
and whether, in times of difficulty, they could be identified as either ‘deserving’ or
‘undeserving’ of state-provided assistance (Kidd ; Hollen-Lees ; Poynter
; Stedman-Jones ; Ross ). Savings banks were one of the key means
by which individuals could engage in income smoothing – that is, manage their
expenditure by saving for the future, and at the same time provide some evidence
of their moral fitness in the new economic and social environment (Wysocki ;
Garon ). Laurence Américi has explicitly referred to the emergence and
growth of savings banks as a process of ‘preparing the people for capitalism’
(Américi ). Wysocki points out that in France and England savings banks were
designed to imbue both a sense of patriotism, in that the savings thus accrued were
used for the benefit of the State, and self-interest, since the savers – by offering up
their hoarded wealth to the State – had a stake in the future of the society in
which they were saving. The notion of saving for the future was to become a very
powerful motif that challenged the stereotype of the live-for-the-moment, spend-
as-get-it, type of attitude displayed by the poor and – crucially – the undeserving
(Johnson ; Wysocki , introduction; Lemire ).
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In England, early attempts to inculcate the values of disciplined daily habits, pro-
vidence and individual saving to smooth income streams were all present in the
first institutions. Jeremy Bentham’s proposal that a national system of ‘Frugality
Banks’ be created, and Patrick Colquhoun’s for a National Deposit Bank never
came to fruition, but Priscilla Wakefield’s Tottenham Benefit Bank, the Sunday
Banks of Joseph Smith and Thomas Lloyd, among others, and the various schemes
of the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor all contained a rich mix of phi-
lanthropy, regularity and moral education (Horne ). Henry Duncan (, p. ),
the minister who established the first savings bank at Ruthwell in Dumfriesshire in
, was clear about what he was trying to achieve:
the only way … by which the higher ranks can give aid to the lower in their temporal con-
cerns, without running the risk of aiding them to their ruin, is by affording every possible
encouragement to industry and virtue … in order to induce the labouring classes to pursue
a system of saving, it is only necessary to present them with facilities for depositing their
surplus earnings, in a situation which combines security with profit.
Parish (or provident) savings banks spread quickly throughout Scotland – by ,
 had been created (Moss and Slaven , p. ) and the Highland Society of
Edinburgh praised their contribution to ‘economy, sobriety, industry and happiness’
(Highland Society of Scotland , pp. -). The other side of this moral education,
however, was that the middle-class promoters of these institutions had to provide clear
and unambiguous security (as well as returns) to the savers. The promise of safety and
respectability offered by the presence of local gentry and wealthy individuals as trus-
tees only went so far. In England, George Rosie’s Savings Bank Act of  estab-
lished the link from savings banks, via the Bank of England, to the Commissioners
for the Reduction of the National Debt so that the hard-earned savings of the
poor could be considered completely safe. This arrangement paid interest in excess
of  per cent and well above the . per cent currently available on consols. In con-
trast to the English case, the Scottish banks, due partly to the lobbying of Henry
Duncan, were excluded from this legislation, and were left free, under the Savings
Bank Act of , to deposit their funds with the Scottish chartered banks. This situ-
ation was fine so long as the chartered banks were happy to pay  per cent and the
savings banks passed on  per cent to their depositors. The decline in interest rates
through the difficult economic period of the s and s, however, squeezed
these margins relentlessly. English depositors continued to receive considerable sub-
sidies from the government in the form of a guaranteed return, while the Scots
laboured to establish both yield and security in the face of occasional malfeasance
and falling incentives (Moss and Slaven , pp.-). The Savings Bank Act of
 extended the provisions of the English system to Scotland and required all
new savings banks to place their deposits with the National Debt Commissioners.
Almost all currently existing independent savings banks chose to convert to the
National Security Savings Bank system, which allowed them to access a guaranteed
return free from the difficulties of local investment or the largesse of the chartered
DUNCAN ROSS
banks, while at the same time offering enhanced security to their depositors. Safety,
security and a relatively trouble-free return were, on the whole, much more attractive
to both depositors and savings bank promoters in Scotland in the years after .
Depositors’ losses in savings banks were few. A Select Committeewas established in
 to examine three cases in Ireland and one very small default in Scotland. The
report referred to ‘gross mismanagement’ and recommended ‘the institution of crim-
inal proceedings’ against at least two of the individuals involved in the largest of
these failures, the St Peter’s Parish Savings Bank in Cuffe Street, Dublin (BPP,
, pp. iii, v).1 TheRochdale fraud of  in England encouraged the government
to issue instructions strengthening the rules governing the management of savings
banks. Legislation, though under active consideration, was rebuffed a number of
times in the subsequent decade (Horne , pp. -). Throughout this period,
however, savings banks were quickly adopted. Horne records that, by ,
, depositors had placed some £.m in  banks across Britain and
Ireland. By , the respective numbers were .m, £.m and  banks.
The peak was reached in , when there were ,, depositors holding
£,, in  banks, but Gladstone’s creation of the Post Office Savings
Bank in that year challenged the supremacy of the savings banks as the appropriate
home for working-class thrift (Horne , appendix II; Daunton , pp. -).
I I
TheNational Security Savings Bank of Glasgowwas constituted under the  legis-
lation and opened for business on  July . The new institution had a -strong
committee of management that represented thewide range of industrial and commer-
cial enterprises in the city, and four of the trustees were connected to one or other of
the city’s many commercial banks (Campbell , pp. -). The bank grew slowly at
first, but quickly became established and popular. Figure  shows the number of
accounts open at the Savings Bank of Glasgow and the total amount held in those
accounts, between  and . These two lines describe steady, at times rapid,
growth, particularly – in sharp contrast to the experience in England – after the foun-
dation of the Post Office Savings Banks in the s.
By , the Glasgow bank was the largest in the UK (Payne , p. ). William
Meikle, the bank’s actuary from  until , whom Horne described as ‘one of
the outstanding figures of savings bank history in the nineteenth century’ (Horne
, p. ), offered four explanations for the bank’s success: a focus on the needs
of the bank’s customers, a commitment to advertising and the maintenance of a
high profile across the city and beyond, encouragement of penny banks to allow
the very poorest to access and benefit from savings facilities, and the rapid spread of
agencies and branches (Meikle ).
1 Ó Gráda () discusses these failures and points out that malfeasance had been ongoing in Cuffe
Street since the s.
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Meikle’s first factor was the ‘care taken by the directors to adapt their arrangements
to thewants of the people’; this included being open (by ) on five days from am
until pm, as well as three evenings a week. On being appointed actuary in January
, one of Meikle’s first suggestions was to simplify the bank’s procedures for
depositing and withdrawing funds.2 He also abolished the need to give notice, and
established the principle of repayment on demand. His views on notice were clear:
‘Although intended to prevent depositors spending their money foolishly, it actually
tends to prevent depositing altogether.’ In , giving evidence to Parliament, he
was able to draw a contrast between the experiences of Glasgow and Manchester in
support of this position (Campbell , p. ).
Meikle’s second explanation for the success of the Glasgow Savings Bank was its
commitment to ‘keeping the bank prominently before the public’. The bank adver-
tised widely and often from its earliest days: in May of , it was noted that the ‘cir-
culation of small notices relative to the progress of the bank and the advantage such an
institution was to depositors’ had substantially increased the number of domestic ser-
vants opening accounts, and another , copies were ordered.3 Circulars were
printed and delivered to ‘clergymen, teachers, managers of public works and other
persons likely to be influential in promoting the objects of the institution’.4
Advertisements were placed in a large number of newspapers circulating in
Glasgow and its surroundings and, in , the bank came to an agreement with
Figure . Total accounts and deposits, Savings Bank of Glasgow, –
Source: GUA TSB///-, Savings Bank of Glasgow, Annual Reports.
2 Glasgow University Archives (hereafter GUA): Trustee Savings Bank Archives, TSB///, scroll
minutes, Special Meeting of the Committee of Management,  February .
3 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  May .
4 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  March .
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the Religious Tract Society to distribute , copies of a handbill across a wide area
of the west of Scotland.5 The commitment to advertising was maintained in sub-
sequent decades. In August , , of the bank’s handbills were printed and dis-
tributed throughout the city;6 prize essays were frequently published, and placards and
posters drawing attention to the Savings Bank were common throughout the city
(Payne , p. ). Annual and special meetings of the Savings Bank were large
and important affairs, usually presided over by the Lord Provost and attracting an
array of senior clergy and the industrial and commercial elite of the city. One
meeting, held on  February , managed to fill the City Halls with ‘a most
respectable and intelligent assemblage, composed chiefly of the working classes’ to
hear lengthy speeches on the benefits of saving (Payne , p. ).7
The ‘third cause of success’ was ‘the fostering and encouraging of penny banks’. In
England and Wales – and even more so Ireland – contemporary criticism of the
savings banks focused on the extent to which they offered relatively high interest
savings vehicles for the already comfortably-off, and their consequent failure to
engage effectively with those for whom they were primarily designed (Fishlow
; Smelser , p. ; Clapham , vol. , p. ).8 This criticism has sur-
vived, but it is now widely accepted that Scottish savings banks were more clearly
focused on the working poor than those in other parts of the UK (Payne ;
Ó Gráda ). Payne’s conclusion left little room for ambiguity: ‘the Glasgow
savings bank did attract and retain the support of the manual worker’ (Payne ,
p. ). One of the ways in which this was done was the encouragement of penny
banks, where the poorest savers could deposit as little as a penny a week (Ross
). The first penny banks were opened in the city in . The Committee of
Management was ‘desirous to aid such efforts for bringing the correct classes within
the influence of the savings bank system’ and took steps to support them.9 In ,
Meikle reported that there were  penny banks, with , depositors, allied to
the Savings Bank of Glasgow –which supplied material in the form of a standard con-
stitution, sets of rules, handbills, pass books and ledgers. The relationship between the
savings and penny banks was captured thus: ‘These auxiliary banks will undoubtedly
conduce in a very material degree to extend downwards in the scale of society a
knowledge of the advantages of savings banks, and a disposition to embrace them.
The committee will continue to give them every encouragement and support
which their rules will allow.’10 The maximum amount that could be held in these
banks was usually set at £, after which the balance was transferred to the Savings
5 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Accounts,  March .
6 GUA TSB///, minutes of the Committee of Management,  August .
7 GUA TSB///, minutes of the Committee of Management,  February ,
8 This phenomenon has also been noted in the United States (Olmstead ).
9 GUA TSB///, minutes of the Committee of Management,  October .
10 GUA TSB///, Annual Report of the Savings Bank of Glasgow, .
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Bank. By encouraging the spread of these institutions the Savings Bank of Glasgow
was able to take the savings message even to those who were least well off.
The fourth and last explanation offered by William Meikle for the success of the
Glasgow bank was the rapid spread of branches and agencies throughout the city.
Ó Gráda has noted that the system of paternalism embodied in these institutions
‘seemed to unite the interests of rich and poor’ (Ó Gráda , p. ). This happy
coincidence made participation in and encouragement of these banks fashionable:
branches and receiving agencies of the Glasgow bank were quickly established in a
number of surrounding villages and towns. Within two years of its establishment,
the Committee of Management of the Savings Bank of Glasgow was expressing ‘grat-
ification… to see appreciation of gentlemen so numerous and respectable formed for
the encouragement and safety of depositors in their respective districts’.11 By ,
two full branches had been established – at Strathaven and Kirkintilloch – and they
were soon joined by Lochgilphead and Hamilton. Payne notes that, by , there
were also  receiving agencies transmitting deposits directly to the head office,
though he describes these as ‘always transitory’ (Payne , fn. ). Nevertheless,
the Management Committee expressed its ambition in  that ‘The substantial
good already realised by the well conducted agencies of Govan, Kingston, Partick,
Dunoon, Shotts, Glasgow Gas Works, Dalquhurn, Milngavie, Hass Cooperage and
several others must encourage the yet wider extension of such dependencies
among our surrounding villages and public works.’12 The location of savings bank
agencies in workplaces as well as towns and villages was an integral component of
the proselytising strategy.
ByMarch , however, the Committee of Management had become concerned
about the agency costs involved in running the branches and ‘instructed the actuary to
carry into effect the disjunction [closure] of the branches’.13 This process was com-
pleted in the four original branches, all of which were located in towns outside the
city, by the end of August, but there was at the same time a strategic shift towards
replacing the transitory agencies with more permanent representation and consolida-
tion within the city boundaries. In October of the same year, the Committee of
Accounts took the view ‘that the existence of savings bank accommodation in
Glasgow was not adequate to the wants of the vast population of the city … and
that some extension of this Bank by means of branches was called for’.14 At first,
the rapidly growing neighbourhoods to the south of the River Clyde appeared to
offer suitable opportunities for expansion, but ‘it was reported that … the south
side of the river was likely to be fully accommodated by two of the ordinary banks
11 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  November .
12 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  December .
13 See the discussion regarding the running of the Lochgilphead branch contained in GUA TSB/
//, scroll minutes,  February . Quote is from GUA: TSB///, scroll minutes,
Committee of Management,  March .
14 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Accounts,  October .
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(the Western and the City)… it had been thought inexpedient of the bank to extend
its operations in that direction’.15 The first of the new branches was opened in
Anderston in . It very quickly came under severe competitive pressure from com-
mercial banks offering higher interest rates, and it closed in August , transferring
the £, s d held in  accounts to the head office.16  was an exceptional
year, however, as will be discussed below, and the managers were not put off the prin-
ciple of branch expansion. By , there were  branches across the city, in addition
to the head office.
The Savings Bank of Glasgow was, by any measure, highly successful throughout
the second half of the nineteenth century. Figure  showed the rise of both accounts
and amount deposited over a long period. Table  shows a comparison between the
Savings Bank of Glasgow and Britain and Ireland (including Glasgow) for the s.
Two things are clear from this table. First, that, in aggregate, Glasgow grew slightly
faster than other savings banks in terms of number of accounts, but more than
twice as much in terms of amount held. Second, it is clear that, while the period
of difficulty in the middle of the decade, and especially in -, was more
Table 1. Accounts and deposits, Britain and Ireland and Glasgow, –
Number of accounts Total deposits
B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow
(s) +/−%
p.a
(s) +/−%
p.a.
£m +/−%
p.a.
£m +/−%
p.a.
 . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . −.
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . −. . . . −.
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
Annual average . . . .
– . . . .
Source: HC, Return of Savings Banks in the United Kingdom, various years.
15 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  March ,
16 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  August .
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challenging for Glasgow than elsewhere, its resilience is revealed in that it bounced
back more strongly than was the general case, in both accounts and deposits,
towards the end of the period.
Table  offers a more detailed comparison of Glasgow and Britain and Ireland.
What emerges from this analysis is that, in the s, Glasgow savers made more fre-
quent but smaller-value deposits than was the norm, and amassed smaller balances at
the savings banks. At the same time, they made more, smaller value, withdrawals.
Over the decade it is clear that the average balance in Britain and Ireland was
falling slowly, while that in the Savings Bank of Glasgow was rising. In terms of man-
agement, Glasgow paid a higher (and stable) interest rate than the average, and its costs
of operation remained lower than the average, though costs across Britain and Ireland
were falling more rapidly. The interest rate, in particular, was valued by Meikle and
the other managers of the bank as a means of attracting depositors.17
Figure  supports the view that the Savings Bank of Glasgow attracted a larger
number of small depositors than was the case more generally, and also confirms the
impression of greater similarity over time. A slightly more fine-grained picture
emerges from Figure , which shows the mean across the s of the annual pro-
portions of account balances. Glasgow clearly shows a much higher proportion of
small balances, and a smaller proportion of the higher balances than the norm.
These results suggest that the Savings Bank of Glasgow in this period was better
able to reach the ‘industrious poor’ and to encourage saving than was the case
across Britain and Ireland.
Figure  shows the weekly deposits and withdrawals at the Savings Bank of
Glasgow for the period from August  until August . Figure  charts the
weekly balance in the same period. The pattern revealed by these two charts is one
of slow early growth, which is consolidated in the mid s, but challenged
around the period of the commercial and banking crisis of  when, for the first
time, withdrawals were consistently in excess of deposits. Recovery from  is
fairly steady, but there is increasing pressure on deposits from  onwards (Horne
(, p. ) refers to the period after  as ‘the four bad years’) and, although
the data are not available after August , it is clear that the pressure being felt in
the commercial and industrial world from early in that year is having an impact on
depositors’ ability to save (and willingness to withdraw). It will be recalled, from
Figure , that both total accounts and total balances described steady growth, with
the exceptions of the crisis years of  and . Perhaps most obvious from
these two charts, however, is the cyclical nature of withdrawals, in particular.
There appear to be regular, bi-annual peaks. Figure  explores this further.
Figure  shows very clearly the impact of the Scottish pattern of rent payments in
the nineteenth century. Rent in this period was paid twice yearly, in May and
November, and, as early as  the trustees of the Govan Receiving Agency were
17 GUATSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management, May , and GUATSB/
//, Committee of Accounts,  June ,
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Table 2. Characteristics of Savings Bank of Glasgow and all Britain and Ireland savings banks, –
Average balance
(£)
Deps per acc.
(£)
W/Ds per acc.
(£)
No. deps per acc. No. W/Ds per
acc.
Interest rate paid
(%)
Expenses ratio (%)
B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow B&I Glasgow
 . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source: HC, Return of Savings Banks in the United Kingdom, various years.
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Figure . Proportion of all account balances <£, –
Source: HC, Savings Banks. Accounts of the Number of Depositors, various years; Savings Bank of
Glasgow, Annual Reports.
Figure . Mean annual proportions of all account balances, –
Source: HC, Savings Banks. Accounts of the Number of Depositors, various years; Savings Bank of
Glasgow, Annual Reports.
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able to record that ‘the operations of this bank, in common with many similar insti-
tutions, have most distinctly shown that persons who can barely make the two ends meet
[emphasis original] find them highly advantageous in enabling them to provide, by
weekly or fortnightly deposits, for rents and other occasional payments’.18 They esti-
mated that total payments in the ‘rent quarters’ – Whitsunday and Martinmas –
exceeded those made in Lammas and Candlemas by approximately  per cent.
This aligns Glasgow savers with those depositors in Philadelphia in the s analysed
by Alter, Goldin and Rotella (). They used the distinction between life-cycle
(long-term), cyclical (regular, predictable events) and target (for large purchases or
life-event) savings. Using a longitudinal approach, they found that most saving was
for target or cyclical purposes but that female domestic servants, in particular, had a
longer-term or life-cycle perspective. In addition, Paul Johnson has suggested that,
in Britain, most working-class savings were short-term and either precautionary or
related to events such as funerals or emigration (Johnson , p. ). The evidence
presented here does not allow a definitive conclusion on themotivations of thosewho
used the Savings Bank of Glasgow, but it is clear that the payment of rent – the most
Figure . Weekly deposits and withdrawals, £, Savings Bank of Glasgow, August  –August 
Adjusted for the branch closures in May/June .
Source: GUA TSB///-, Savings Bank of Glasgow, scroll minutes of the monthly
meetings of the Committee of Accounts
18 GUATSB///, Fourth Annual Report of the Govan Agency. Appendix to the Annual Report
for .
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regular and predictable cyclical demand made on working-class savers – dominated
these account-holders. There is also some evidence of target saving. The annual
report for  noted that the amount of withdrawals was particularly high in that
year, ‘caused principally by withdrawals for the purposes of emigration. In the early
part of the year, many hundreds of the most regular depositors closed their connection
with the bank and left the country, taking with them considerable sums which had
accumulated in the bank.’19 In , the same complaint was made, that the larger
than usual amount of repayments was ‘partly accounted for by the withdrawal, in
the early part of the year, of considerable sums for emigration’.20
I I I
The commercial and financial crises of  and  –which both seem to have had
an impact on savings behaviour – were similar in many ways: periods of industrial
expansion and financial speculation led to a boom, but a rapid shift in economic con-
ditions overseas resulted in a sharp tightening of credit. In , the problem was
mostly caused by domestic speculation in the railway boom, though the Scottish
cotton and iron industries played their part (Saville , p. ). A serious financial
panic in April and May of that year appeared to have passed with few casualties but, in
Figure . Weekly balance (deposits–withdrawals), £,  August  –  August 
Adjusted for the branch closures in May/June .
Source: GUA TSB///-, Savings Bank of Glasgow, scroll minutes of the monthly
meetings of the Committee of Accounts.
19 GUA TSB ///, Annual Report, .
20 GUA TSB ///, Annual Report, .
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the late summer, a domestic harvest failure and a precipitous fall in the price of sugar
meant that some merchants were unable to meet payments due on their bills. A
number of discount houses and provincial banking companies failed throughout
the UK, the demand for credit increased rapidly and the Bank of England came
under severe pressure to relax the restrictions on money supply embodied in the
 Banking Act (Ross ). One banker noted that this crisis was ‘the most diffi-
cult the commercial world has ever experienced’ (Munro , p. ) and in
Glasgow a meeting of around  merchants and manufacturers decided to apply to
the government for ‘a temporary suspension of the clauses of the bank restriction
act’.21 Responding to very widespread public concern, on Saturday  October,
the government authorised the Bank of England to issue notes without limit from
the following Monday. By the end of the month, the position had stabilised.
Dornbusch and Frenkel (, p. ) see this crisis as essentially one of internal con-
vertibility, in which ‘suspension of the act removed any conceivable basis for panic
and therefore immediately restored a measure of financial stability’. By  October,
the Glasgow Herald reported ‘some symptoms of improvement in the money
Figure . Annual weekly average balance, £, August  – August 
Adjusted for the branch closures in May/June , and for the  week years in , 
and 
Source: GUA TSB///-, Savings Bank of Glasgow, scroll minutes of the monthly
meetings of the Committee of Accounts.
21 Glasgow Herald,  October .
SAV INGS BANK DEPOS ITORS IN A CRIS I S : GLASGOW  AND  
market’, and, by the th, it recorded that ‘in all quarters, confidence has been greatly
restored’.22
The difficulties in  followed a similar pattern. A period of expansion was fol-
lowed by a tightening of monetary conditions. Depression in the USA quickly trans-
lated into failures of merchants and banking houses in Liverpool, Glasgow and
London. This exacerbated the difficulties of accessing credit and by the beginning
of November many bill brokers could only obtain cash from the Bank of England
on very difficult terms. Once again, the government was forced to suspend the
 Bank Act, and, again, this quickly allowed confidence to return to the
banking system.
In each of these cases, pressure on the banking system was severe and credit was in
short supply. But this should have had little impact on savings banks, which did not
offer credit and whose deposits were perfectly safe with the Commissioners for the
Reduction of the National Debt. On the other hand, the security and liquidity
which had been trumpeted as the key elements of savings bank deposits clearly
meant that they were subject to rapid withdrawal. During the month of November
, the Savings Bank of Glasgow lost more than  per cent of its total deposits.
Despite the rapid restoration of confidence in the money markets, the economic dif-
ficulties of the subsequent year meant that it was March  before the total sums
deposited in the bank regained the level of December .
In , the peak of the crisis came at the same time as the normal rent withdrawals
from the savings bank accounts. But there were additional, local elements in Glasgow
that exacerbated the problem in that year. As early as , the Western Bank had
considered ‘the propriety of granting to the working classes further facilities at the
branch offices of that bank’.23 The Western was something of an enfant terrible
among the Glasgow commercial banks and was viewed with suspicion, particularly
by the chartered banks in Edinburgh, who would never have entertained the
notion of attracting small working-class savers into their establishments (Malcolm
, p. ; Campbell, ). As its balance sheet position deteriorated, the
Western sought desperately to attract liquidity and did this by opening branches
aimed at poorer depositors.24 It was noted above that, in , the Western and
City Banks had thwarted the Savings Bank’s desire to expand south of the River
Clyde, and that the higher interest rates ( per cent on all deposits of one shilling
and upwards) which they offered on savings accounts led to the early demise of the
Savings Bank of Glasgow branch that had been opened in Anderston.25 Confusion
was further spread by many of these commercial branches referring to and advertising
22 Glasgow Herald,  and  October .
23 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  December .
24 Richard Saville (, pp. -) notes that, by July , the Western’s directors were faced with
‘hopelessly’ bad debts of £, in addition to a list of doubtful debts on the USA held by four
Glasgow firms whose bills the Western had discounted.
25 GUA TSB///, scroll minutes, Committee of Management,  January ,
DUNCAN ROSS
themselves as ‘savings bank’ branches. An article in The Times on  October
suggested that the Western was to be wound up, and this increased the drain on
deposits in that bank. The Bank of England was prevailed upon to offer relief, but
initially refused. The Western Bank eventually closed at pm on Monday 
November , and the run on commercial banks spread very quickly across the
city, particularly to the savings bank branches of the City of Glasgow Bank, which
were open in the evening.26 One prominent banker in the city recorded in his
diary ‘This day will long be remembered in Glasgow as one of the blackest in the
annals of its commercial history … I tremble for tomorrow and Wednesday’
(Munn , p. ). The Glasgow Herald reported that ‘on Monday afternoon a
crowd of persons, small depositors, besieged the doors of the Trongate branch of
the City of Glasgow Bank and so pressing did they become that a body of police
were called out who succeeded in clearing the streets. Yesterday [Tuesday] the exci-
tement still continued and at an early hour in the morning, a run commenced upon
several banks in town.’27 The notes of the Western Bank were refused throughout
Tuesday th, largely on the insistence of the Edinburgh banks, and the clamour
from depositors intensified.28 The City of Glasgow Bank remained closed on the
Wednesday, but during that day the Edinburgh banks agreed to begin accepting
the notes of the Western Bank and the City of Glasgow Bank once more; the city
magistrates in Glasgow declared them acceptable ‘in payment of police, water,
poor and other rates and assessments’,29 and a supply of gold for the commercial
banks arrived by train from London, easing the liquidity position. The local panic
was largely over by the afternoon of Wednesday th and the following day the gov-
ernment allowed monetary easing by relaxing the strictures of the Bank Act.30
The impact of all this on the Savings Bank of Glasgow was serious, but not dama-
ging. The directors, at their meeting on  November, recorded their thanks to the
National Debt Office, ‘for the energy and promptitude with which … [it] supplied
the urgent demands of the Bank during the recent monetary panic’. They also
wished to
26 A dramatic narrative and account of this run is given by James Robertson, manager of the Union Bank
of Scotland, in his evidence to the Select Committee in  (BPP, -). Evidence of James
Robertson,  April .
27 Glasgow Herald,  November .
28 The actions of the Edinburgh banks came in for some serious local criticism: ‘The City of Glasgow
bank has been forced temporarily to suspend in consequence of the distrust created by the fall of the
Western, and the fall of theWestern might have been averted by the timely cooperation and assistance
of the leading Scotch banks. The whole community is disgusted at the pride, selfishness, isolation and
utter want of head displayed by the directors of our monetary institutions and the callousness and stu-
pidity with which they sacrifice the honour and interests of this immense city day after day to a mis-
erable vanity and egotism.’ Report in the Glasgow Herald,  November .
29 Glasgow Herald,  November .
30 BPP (-), evidence of James Robertson,  April .
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record their approval of the efficient manner in which Mr Meikle and the other officers and
clerks discharged their duties to the bank and to the public on the occasion. – It is especially
gratifying to the directors to know that thewhole business details during the trying emergency
were conducted with the greatest order and regularity – and that although the amounts
received and paid exceeded £,, the requirements of every depositor were promptly
met and the bank’s cash was balanced each day with perfect accuracy – and all the proceedings
of the bank were conducted in the usual correct routine.
The directors have also to express the obligations they are under to the Police force for their
firmness yet considerateness, during a most eventful and trying occasion.31
The daily and weekly data used to generate Figures  and  are not available for the
period of the crisis, but the Committee of Management noted that the run occurred
on ,  and  November, and that there were , payments amounting to
£, s d. These three days would, in any case, have been the busiest of the
period, since rents were due on  November. The Committee calculated that, on
the three corresponding days in , the number of repayments was , and the
amount repaid was £, s d. The crisis, therefore, brought an increase of 
per cent in the number of payments and  per cent in the money withdrawn
over the previous year.32 This was a considerably sharper short-term impact than a
decade earlier. The period of the crisis of  (, ,  and  October)
showed an increase in withdrawals over the corresponding dates (, , , 
October) in  of only . per cent. But the longer-term impact was much
more severe in the earlier crisis. Whereas the Savings Bank of Glasgow endured a
period of steady decline in total deposits after the  crisis, occasioned by continued
industrial and commercial distress, the Annual Report for  noted that the ‘drain
was very temporary, and the money is now being rapidly restored’.33 The following
year, although there had been considerable unemployment, and ‘great depression in
several important branches of trade and manufacture’, the total deposits rose by more
than £,, for two main reasons: ‘the replacement of money withdrawn during the
panic, and from the transfer of accounts from other banks that have ceased to transact
Savings Bank business’.34 Glasgow’s experience was in line with that elsewhere.
Horne (, pp. -) noted that the latter crisis was ‘not nearly so damaging’ to
savings banks as the former and that, even in Glasgow, buffeted as it was by the par-
ticular difficulties of the Western and City of Glasgow Banks, ‘the real effect of the
crisis … was not really as severe as in ’.
The impact of the financial crises in Glasgow was significant – in , the
reduction in deposits was long-lasting, while in , it was particularly sharp in
the short term as a result of a number of specific and primarily local characteristics.
It should also be noted that the Savings Bank of Glasgow, unlike the Western
31 GUA TSB///, minutes of the Directors’ Meeting,  November .
32 GUA TSB///, minutes of the Committee of Management,  December .
33 GUA TSB///, Annual Report, .
34 GUA TSB///, Annual Report, .
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Bank and the City of Glasgow Bank, was never in any danger of running out of
liquidity or of having to suspend payments. Even at the height of the crisis in ,
when the pressure for withdrawals was most intense, the institution could easily
access additional funds from the National Debt Office.35 Nevertheless, the general
conditions of panic and contagion, greatly exacerbated in  by the confusion
between the Savings Bank of Glasgow and the savings bank branches of the City of
Glasgow and Western Banks, clearly intensified the demand for cash.
IV
Cormac Ó Gráda (, ; Ó Gráda and White ) has asked, in a number of
papers exploring the experiences of the Thurles Savings Bank in County Tipperary,
Ireland, and the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, in New York, whether those who
panicked and withdrew their funds during a financial crisis were systematically differ-
ent from those who held their nerve. Tables  and  present some results of an analysis
Table 3. Proportions of  and  closers and control groups, and all accounts opened to  and
, by occupational categories
 
closers control all
-
closers control all
-
Domestic servants . . . . . .
Mechanics, unclassified and
their wives
. . . . . .
Factory operatives . . . . . .
Female warehouse workers
and sewers
. . . . . .
Clerks and warehousemen . . . . . .
Shopkeepers and small traders . . . . . .
Labourers, carters, porters . . . . . .
Professional persons . . . . . .
Agricultural employments . . . . . .
Minors, under  years . . . . . .
Householders, lodging-house
keepers
. . . . . .
Others (including none) . . . . . .
Source: see text, and Glasgow University Archives, TSB///-, Savings Bank of
Glasgow, Annual Reports.
35 One draft for £, was lodged with the National Debt Office on November, two for £,
each on  November, and one for £, on  November. GUA TSB///, minutes of the
Directors Meeting,  November ,
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of savers in the Savings Bank of Glasgow in  and . Using the deposit ledgers,
it was possible to identify those who closed their accounts during the periods of great-
est exigency (, , , October  and , , , November ), and then
trace the operations of those accounts back to the point at which they were opened. In
this way,  closers (of the , open accounts on  October) were identified in
, and  (the latest figure available is , open accounts on  August) in
the later year. To generate a control group, a random sample of accounts opened
in the same period as that represented by the closers was created (i.e. accounts
opened between  August  and  October , and between  January
 and  November ).
A number of comments about these populations should be made. First, it is possible
that they do not capture every closer in the periods of crisis. Care has been taken to
identify every account, but it is impossible to be completely confident on this score.
Further, it is clear that the number of accounts closing in these periods of panic is a
very small proportion of the total numbers open, which suggests (given the overall
decline in money held by the savings bank) that a much more common response to
the crisis was withdrawal from an account that was then left open. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to assess the characteristics of those who withdrew a large proportion
of their savings, rather than close their account. Second, it may be that some of those
who closed their accounts did so for reasons unconnected with the panics. There is
no way to tell. Third, it should be noted that the control populations were selected
entirely at random, by account number. They should represent the very wide range
of account behaviour, including those open for long periods and short, those who
made many deposits and very few, and those who closed their accounts before,
during and after the crisis. In fact, there is no case in these populations of any of the
‘control’ accounts being closed during either crisis. Fourth, many of the accounts – par-
ticularly in the control groups – were open for a considerable period and therefore are
recorded in more than one ledger book. Some ledger books have been lost or destroyed
and it was not possible to trace fully three accounts from the  control group.Most of
the data reported in that column, therefore, refer to , rather than , accounts.
Table  presents these account holders by occupational category, using the categ-
orisations presented in the annual reports. The occupational categorisations were
made on the basis of the descriptions in the depositors’ ledgers and declaration
books – it is possible that some will have been placed in an inappropriate group.
There does appear to be a consistent under-categorisation of domestic servants, and
over-categorisation of ‘others’. Nevertheless, this table offers broad support, given
the small numbers, particularly for the  groups, for the view that the samples
being analysed are approximately in line with the wider population of the bank’s
account holders.
Table  contains some interesting comparisons, both between the two groups in
each period, and between the two periods themselves. First, the overall gender
balance reported in these groups (% male, % female in ; % male, %
female in ) is generally in line with the breakdown noted in the  Annual
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Report, that of the total of , accounts opened up to that date, .% had been
opened by men, and .% by women.36 The later period has a number of joint
accounts, and fewer children. There are no obvious differences in the number of
accounts being opened (or closed) by savers from beyond Glasgow, though it is
perhaps worth noting that among those who closed their accounts in the 
crisis was one Donald McInnes, who gave his occupation as ‘steward’ and his
address as New York. The  control group included Janet Dunn, a servant
whose address was  Oxford Street, London.
It is to be expected, of course, that those in the control group would have their
accounts open for longer than those who closed, but the point should be made
that this adds to the impression that closers panicked during the days of crisis, and
removed their savings before they would have done in the ordinary course of
events. This was true in both years, but particularly so in . In addition to the
Table 4. Comparisons of closed and control accounts in the  and  crises
 
closers control significanceb closers control significanceb
n    
Male    
Female    
Joint accounts    
Age <     
Outside Glasgow    
Average days open . .a ** . . ***
Average opening
deposit (£)
. . . . **
Average number of
deposits
. .a ** . . **
Average number of
withdrawals
. .a *** . . **
Days/deposits . .a . . ***
Days/withdrawals . .a . . ***
Average final
withdrawal (£)
. .a ** . . ***
a of 
b in a two-tailed t-test, the difference between the closers and control group is statistically
significant at *** = %; ** = % and * = % confidence levels.
Source: GUA TSB////-, Savings Bank of Glasgow, depositors’ ledgers,
–.
36 GUA TSB///, draft Annual Report, , Management Committee minutes.
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means reported in Table , the median numbers of days for which the closer and
control groups of accounts were open in  were  and , respectively; in
 the median life spans were  and  days. This supports the view that the
 crisis had a much bigger short-term impact than that of a decade earlier. The
longest-lived account of all the groups was opened by Agnes Stewart, a -year-
old servant from Inverary, on  December . Her account remained open and
active for almost  years, until the  April , when a balance of £ s d
was withdrawn.37 The longest surviving account from the  group was opened
by William Nicol, a labourer, on  November , and closed on  December
. These examples of longevity were exceptional, however: an account life of
somewhere between one and five years was much more common.
Table  also reveals a pattern of more systematic differences between the closers and
the control group in  than was the case in the earlier year. Again, the impact of
the crisis is notable in that many depositors closed their accounts before they might
ordinarily have done so, and this is reinforced by the significance of the differences
in the days open per deposit and withdrawal values. Those who panicked in
November  used their accounts much more regularly than those in the control
group. They also had significantly smaller opening and closing balances than the
others – and, again, the differences in  are greater than those found between
the  groups. Those who panicked in  and closed their account with the
Savings Bank of Glasgow were systematically different from those who did not.
They represented the smaller, less wealthy savers who used their accounts more reg-
ularly, but saved less: they participated in the kind of careful husbanding of meagre
resources that the savings banks were designed to encourage. This group had the
lowest proportion of savers from outside the city, and they might therefore be
thought of as more likely to have been infected by the rumours, gossip and panic
that infected Glasgow in the heady days of November .
In both years,  and , it would seem that the pressure on the savings bank
was a result of general contagion from the difficulties being experienced in the indus-
trial and commercial communities in the city. It is hard to see – particularly in the
earlier crisis – how this could be classified as a run on the bank, the withdrawals
simply being a result of the general economic difficulties of the period. There
could be no asymmetric or private information about potential illiquidity or insol-
vency of the Savings Bank of Glasgow because such an outcomewas entirely unlikely.
In , there were additional factors, specifically the failure of theWestern Bank, the
suspension of payments by the City of Glasgow Bank, and the fact that both of these
institutions had established ‘savings bank branches’ that were not linked to the
National Security system, which introduced some considerable confusion into the
mix. Those who panicked and closed their accounts in this later crisis were
37 This is, of course, only one account, but it does accord with Alter, Goldin and Rotella’s () obser-
vation that domestic servants in Philadelphia were those most likely to engage in a pattern of life-cycle
saving.
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systematically different from those who did not, which suggests that they were subject
to a particular type of contagion characterised by a level and type of information dif-
fusion that was incomplete, unsubstantiated and confused.
V
Savings banks were created for a complex mixture of reasons. Partly to reduce pressure
on the Poor Laws, they sought to encourage the new urban industrial working classes
to take responsibility for themselves and their families. They also provided an impor-
tant avenue by which the middle classes could meet their own obligations to provide
philanthropic and moral leadership and guidance. In Britain, the depositing of accu-
mulated balances with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt
provided safety and security to the savers, but also offered a nominal stake in the con-
struction of the new forms of society. In Glasgow, which was in many ways the quin-
tessential Victorian industrial city, the savings bank successfully ticked all of these
boxes. Founded and led by the industrial and commercial elite of the city, it
quickly became a symbol of civic pride and was adopted by large numbers of individ-
ual savers. The Savings Bank of Glasgow was more successful than most in reaching
the industrious poor and its depositors reflected the wide and heterogeneous nature
of the working-class population of the city. It was particularly fortunate in appointing
William Meikle as a clear and strategic-thinking actuary and the Savings Bank of
Glasgow was able to maintain steady growth even after Gladstone’s creation of the
Post Office Savings Bank in . The financial and commercial crises of  and
 had a significant impact on savings banks generally, and the Savings Bank of
Glasgow in particular. The first of these two crises was reflected in a long-term
reduction in both savings and accounts open at the bank; while the second, which
was considerably worsened by the panic that brought down one of the city’s commer-
cial banks and temporary closure of another, was much more severe in the short term,
but of little importance in the longer perspective. Both crises resulted in elevated
withdrawals from the savings bank as a result of the commercial and industrial diffi-
culties of the period. Detailed analysis of depositors’ responses to the two crises
suggests that, in , those who closed their accounts were not substantially different
from those who did not; they appear to have withdrawn funds simply to meet the
needs of income smoothing in times of exigency. Those who panicked and closed
their accounts in the  crisis, however, were systematically and significantly differ-
ent from those who remained with the savings bank, and appear to have acted as a
result of contagion from the local commercial and banking difficulties.
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Sources
The primary sources on which this article is based are the records of the Savings Bank
of Glasgow, TSB in the records of the Trustee Savings Bank Scotland. These
records were held at the Glasgow University Archives (GUA) until shortly after the
completion of this article, and they are cited as being located in Glasgow. They
have, however, since been moved to the Lloyds TSB Group Archives, Edinburgh.
I have not consulted the records in Edinburgh.
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